Spitfire! by Dilip Sarkar

Author:Dilip Sarkar
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: HISTORY/Military/Aviation
ISBN: 9781526732828
Publisher: Air World
Published: 2019-06-29T00:00:00+00:00

However, 30 August was a significant day for Squadron Leader Douglas Bader’s Coltishall-based 242 Squadron, which would have ramifications not just for 242 but equally 12 Group and ultimately Fighter Command as a whole.

On that day, Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory also sent 242 Squadron to Duxford, there to await events closer to the action. At 1600 hours, 300-plus bandits were reported incoming over Kent and the Thames Estuary, splitting in two and attacking airfields in 11 Group. At 1620, sixty He 111s and their Me 110 escorts were incoming north of the Thames. Anticipating an attack on North Weald and Hornchurch, 11 Group requested assistance from 12 Group via Fighter Command HQ. At 1623 Wing Commander Woodhall scrambled 242 to patrol North Weald at Angels 15. As Squadron Leader Bader led fourteen Hurricanes south, the incoming threat separated and headed for two different targets: I/KG1 bound for the Vauxhall Motor Works and aerodrome at Luton, whilst II/KG53, the larger of the two formations, fought its way to the Handley Page Aircraft factory at Radlett. In response, 11 Group scrambled further squadrons. In Reach for the Sky, author Paul Brickhill claimed that Bader contradicted the Controller’s instructions, knowing better, flying contrary to the ordered course and consequently intercepting the Radlett raiders. This is not so. Primary evidence suggests that 242 Squadron was guided to what was a successful interception by the Controller. The vast enemy formation travelling east, the like of which none of 242 Squadron’s pilots had seen before, was, according to their leader ‘awe-inspiring’.36 Up-sun and with the advantage of height, 242 Squadron was perfectly positioned for a surprise attack. After the ensuing combat, an elated 242 Squadron returned to Duxford, claiming eight Me 110s destroyed and another damaged, and five He 111s destroyed for no loss. All were confirmed, although today it is impossible to corroborate more than two Me 110s and an He 111. This is because of the confusion of air fighting involving many aircraft, with pilots simultaneously attacking the same target, oblivious to each other’s presence, meaning that one enemy machine could be multiplied many times on the balance sheet. Nonetheless, there appears to have been little or no effort to more appropriately scrutinise 242’s claims, which were accepted in their entirety.

No. 242 Squadron’s apparent and unprecedented success inspired various congratulatory signals not only from Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory but even the CAS. The experience confirmed in Bader’s mind that, contrary to the System, 12 Group should be operating mass formations of fighters, able to either roam over the aerial battlefield for deployment at their leader’s direction, or be scrambled and vectored en masse towards the trouble. Bader immediately submitted his report ‘Fighter Tactics v Escort & Bomber Formations’, promoting his theories. The truth was, though, that 11 Group’s smaller formations, in action daily, did not overclaim to the extent that the comparatively inexperienced 242 Squadron did on 30 August 1940. Moreover, 242 had been perfectly positioned by the Controller, not the leader in the air as later claimed by Brickhill.

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